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Approved For Release 2004/01/28 : CIA-RDP82T00285R000200240018-9

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1 October 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Effects on IAS of No Preliminary Assessment

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1. We have reviewed the effects on our operations of the decision not to produce a preliminary assessment on

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No disadvantages to IAS were apparent as we went about our business of rapidly assimilating the new photography into our files. In the process, we selected 14 prints for minibords which, together with a brief write-up on each, we passed to OSR for further dissemination as they deemed appropriate.

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2. The number of phone calls from production office analysts generated by NPIC cables was not excessive, and they did not interrupt our operations more than usual.

3. Our mission- or bucket-oriented reporting was not affected. In fact, our responses of this type were more timely than usual. Because we were not involved in briefing visiting analysts and reviewing their assessment write-ups, we could concentrate more quickly on preparing intelligence memoranda for production office use. We responded to the usual number of articles for the NID and NIB and production office drafts on "hold" items. We also fielded associated gray line queries.

4. To keep the above in proper perspective, however, it should be noted that

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5. Although we accomplished our essential tasks in the absence of the assessment, I for one felt the lack of a vehicle for pulling together the overall intelligence value or content of the first part of the mission. Even more important was the absence of a mechanism for getting analysts to promptly discuss and coordinate mutual

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substantive problems stemming from this mission. The value of these functions, which are accomplished by the assessment process, should be weighed with other factors in considering whether assessments should be prepared on future missions.

GEORGE W. ALLEN

Director

Imagery Analysis Service

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